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ABSTRACT
A certain unity among the Baltic states emerged during their simultaneous fights for independ-
ence and for recognition by the great powers in Europe and the US. The recognition was given 
separately to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and not commonly to the Baltic states. This article 
tries to determine when and under what circumstances the Baltic question reached the institutions 
and leading persons dealing with foreign relations in the US as a separate problem independent of 
Russia. After the independence of the Baltic states, there followed a repelling attitude from the US 
and non-recognition until 1922. 
On 28 July 1922, at 11 o’clock, Charles H. Albrecht, the US consul stationed in Tallinn, arrived for 
an audience with Ants Piip, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia.1 The meeting had been 
prearranged, and the Minister was aware of its purpose. At the same time, similar procedures 
were performed in Riga and Kaunas. The news had already rolled off the printing presses of 
some US newspapers, ready for the morning reader. Thanks to the time difference, the official 
notes could be handed over in the Baltic capitals before the release of the newspapers. It 
represented the long-awaited de jure recognition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by the USA, 
the decision passed by the government on 25 July 1922. 
Surprisingly, the foreign policy and the place in international relations of Estonia and of 
the other Baltic states in 1917–1919 have found an extensive treatment by Finnish scholars 
(Kalervo Hovi 1973, 1975, 1976, 1984a, 1984b, Olavi Hovi 1980, Zetterberg 1977). An in-depth 
analysis has been made of the problems related to granting recognition to Estonia and the 
other Baltic states by Finland and the Scandinavian countries. The most voluminous research 
to date on the issue of the US de iure is a monograph published in 1965 by Albert N. Tarulis, 
a scholar of Lithuanian extraction (Tarulis 1965). He drew on the previously published US 
foreign policy documents, corresponding collections at the National Archives and materials 
from expatriate Lithuanians operating in America. Therefore, he primarily portrays the internal 
pressure exerted on the State Department by the so-called Baltic people using various levers 
and levels for the purpose of obtaining recognition and the right to designate diplomatic and 
consular representatives. To a lesser extent, he analyses the reasons why the US administra-
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tion delayed the decision of recognition for so long. Nevertheless, Tarulis was the first to raise 
the question: Was the US de jure recognition of the Baltic states in 1922 conditional? For the 
USA, the conditionality of the recognition was due first of all to its relations with Russia, which 
Tarulis treated in less detail. Also, the issue of debts received relatively little attention from him. 
Constantine R. Jurgela approached the same topic as a special Lithuanian case study (Jurgela 
1985). His research on the establishment of state relations between Lithuania and the United 
States was based mostly on the published US foreign policy documents. He estimated highly 
the pressing to the US president Harding by the Lithuanian–American community, but he seems 
to avoid the fact that the recognition was given simultaneously to all three Baltic states. He 
and especially Alfonsas Eidintas pointed out the role of different institutions of the Lithuanian 
emigration and their activity in achieving the recognition of Lithuania (Eidintas 2003: 115–146). 
From the point of view of Lithuania, understandable were attempts to depict the process of 
receiving independency as the restoration of the old historical statehood. Valdemaras and other 
political leaders believed that Lithuania had ancient state traditions, and the status of Lithuania 
and of Estonia and Latvia differed under international law. Estonia and Latvia were the new 
constructions based mainly on the comparatively new principle of national self-determination. 
Valdemaras believed that Lithuania could retain its independence when Russia would sooner 
or later seek to regain the Baltic window through Estonia and Latvia (Žaylys 1997: 100). Ironi-
cally, the de jure recognition of Latvia and Estonia by the European powers more than a year 
before Lithuanian’s recognition and simultaneously de jure by the US in 1922 proved that this 
kind of hopes was baseless.
Why is the issue of recognition important? 
Washington’s attitude to the official recognition of the Baltic states was not at all unequivocal. 
When the so-called Great Allies were forged during WWII, some of the key players of the US 
foreign policy held to the view that the recognition of the Baltic states was not quite “right” all 
along (Medijainen 2010: 153–190). This is exactly the impression one may get while reading 
the texts related to the US official recognition without tackling the wider context. Namely, the 
Secretary of State’s explanatory note of 25 July 1922 stated that while granting recognition to 
the Baltic states “the United States has consistently maintained that the disturbed conditions 
of the Russian affairs may not be made the occasion for the alienation of Russian territory, and 
this principle is not deemed to be infringed by the recognition at this time of the Governments 
of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which have been set up and maintained by an indigenous 
population.“2 
A similar argument had been brought up previously when granting recognition to some other 
states that had seceded from Russia (Poland, Finland, Armenia). Furthermore, emphasising 
Russia’s integrity did not at all mean recognising the Soviet rule. Rather, the survival of the 
Soviet regime in Russia was to become the main argument for the continued confirmation of 
the de jure independence of the Baltic states. However, we must take into account also other 
documents which show the attitudes towards the Baltic region in the beginning of the 1920s. 
2  The Commissioner at Riga (Young) to the Secretary of State April 6, 1922, FRUS, 869–872.
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On 6 April 1922, the then US Commissioner in Riga Evald E. Young submitted a longer report 
to the State Department on his thoughts about the need to recognise the Baltic states. In it, 
he stressed more than once that a time was likely to come when Russia’s integrity would be 
restored in one form or another, and that it would even be in the US interests. At the same 
time, he unequivocally supported the recognition of the Baltic states so “this part of Russia 
will remain free from the ravages of the present Moscow regime.”3 
The objective of the present paper, unlike the aforementioned study by Tarulis, is to point 
out that it was not the Republicans’ rise to power in 1920 that changed Washington’s so-called 
official attitude towards the recognition of the Baltic states formed during Wilson’s presidency, 
but rather the developments in Soviet Russia (the Far East issue) and, even more importantly, 
the problems in Europe, including the Baltic states, related to the military debts and loans 
owed to the USA. 
WILSON AND THE BALTIC ISSUE 
The United States of America entered the war in 1917 only as a state associated with the En-
tente powers. Washington did not bind itself formally with wartime and postwar obligations. 
Woodrow Wilson did not restrict himself when entering the war; he did not trust the allies’ 
motives and goals (Floto 1980: 25). The President reserved himself a free hand and the right to 
conclude independent peace treaties with the losers of the war. At the same time, the Entente 
powers had to reckon with the USA as the principal and decisive power. Its entry into the war 
tipped the military balance in favour of the Entente, and thanks to that the Great War could be 
ended in November 1918. By then, about 70% of the world’s gold reserves had accumulated in 
the USA; it had become the global financial centre. In addition, it was confirmed in November 
1918 that about 60% of the world’s food supplies were under the US control, while in Europe 
foodstuffs sufficed for a mere seven months at the most. In some areas, especially in Eastern 
Europe, the situation was far more strained than that, with the threat of a full-blown famine 
looming. Washington decided to distribute food aid to Europe beginning from January 1919; 
the “Baltic States of Russia” were also ranked among the countries in urgent need of food aid 
(Organization of American Relief in Europe 1943: 49–50, 143). Unfortunately, the US president, 
as well as the authorities in Washington (first of all the State Department) had no clear stance 
on how to conduct relations with Russia, including the independence-minded Baltic states. 
The USA was the first country to recognise the overthrow of the Romanovs and the estab-
lishment of a democratic republic and its provisional government (Saul 2007: 35). There was a 
widespread belief in 1917 that the Russian people were following the US example on the path 
to democracy; even the Bolshevist coup was initially seen as a small hurdle soon to be cleared 
(Foglesong 2007: 35). After the Bolshevist rise to power in Petrograd, several response options 
were initially circulating among the Allies. First, it seemed possible to topple them by a military 
intervention, which was supported by some of the politicians and military leaders of the Allied 
3  Charles H. Albrecht to Anton Piip, February 16, 1922,. RG 58 American Consulate, Reval, Correspondence 
1921. National Archives (NA). 
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powers and part of Russian emigrants. The other option was the idea of a so-called sanitary 
cordon, which also found influential supporters. Unfortunately, the sanitary cordon formed of 
Russia’s border regions would essentially have meant a death cordon, and it is doubtful that 
in this case the first ones to die of hunger and disease would have been the Bolsheviks. The 
Baltic states were not enthused over being part of such a sanitary cordon. Estonia’s fledgling 
diplomacy therefore stressed in 1918–1919 that they were by no means going to obstruct 
communication between Russia and other states but, on the contrary, committed to offer it 
their full support. As a third option, the plan to convene a Roman Empire-style conference at-
tended by all the Russia-related parties on the Prinkipo (Prince) Islands was discussed in early 
1919 (The Bullitt mission 1977: 6–10). 
Wilson was satisfied with none of the aforementioned options. At first, he endeavoured to 
employ economic measures, such as granting government loans and supporting the private 
sector in order to boost trade relations between the USA and Russia (Bacino 1999). The support 
to trade was expected to bolster Russia’s private enterprise, which was to become the mainstay 
of the emergent democracy. It was believed in the USA that securing normal circumstances – 
free enterprise for the people, infrastructure and market for agriculture, development of trade 
and strengthening local authorities – for some parts of Russia would also reinforce democracy 
in Russia. Sadly, the USA and Russia were increasingly heading towards totally divergent paths 
(McFadden 1993). Despite the President’s initial opposition, US troops (ca 15,000 men) were 
sent to Russia in 1918–1919, primarily to protect the ports of Murmansk and Archangelsk as 
well as Vladivastok. This period is referred to as intervention in or even war against Soviet Russia 
(Kennan 1984, Foglesong 1995). 
The motives for meddling in Russia’s affairs have been interpreted in different ways (Trani 
1976, 440–461). Even the extensive food aid provided by the USA to Russia to relieve the 
famine of 1919–1921, not to mention the Red Cross operations, may be regarded as some 
sort of humanitarian intervention (Fisher 1927, Surface and Bland 1931, Weissman 1974, 
Patenaude 2002). 
The President himself did not see the sending of small military units to Russia in 1918 as an 
intervention (Unterberger 1989: 265). There are authors, however, who think the US should 
have been much more forceful in doing so. The intervention was unconfident and too modest 
to sufficiently support the main objective – to help Russia onto the path of democracy. Rus-
sia was left alone, its outstretched hand was not accepted by Wilson, it was betrayed by the 
USA; the so-called new democratic Russia, deserted by all, was doomed to death. According 
to Victor Fic, the decision not to interfere and pull out of Russia was a mistake that had grave 
consequences for both Russia itself and for the whole world. In his words, Wilson killed the 
then initiative of the Allies. The President’s previous policy to do nothing was replaced with 
the banner to do something, with the stress on the last word. The prospects for democracy in 
Russia were thus betrayed, and that by a man whose avowed aim was to save democracy for 
the world (Fic 1995: 19–20, 139–140, 330). 
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FORMULATION OF THE COLBY DOCTRINE 
Thereafter, no common ground was reached during the peace conference in Paris. It is possible 
that Wilson’s main problem was little knowledge about Russia’s situation. He had not taken 
much interest in Russia before entering the world war (Davies and Trani 2002: 2). In the US 
peace mission that reached Paris, some advisers stressed the right of Russia’s border nations 
to self-determination while others propounded the principle of territorial integrity. For Wilson 
and some other leading decision-makers, preservation of Russia’s integrity seemed to be one of 
the key policies. The history of the US’s own Civil War served as an argument for the President 
and the Secretary of State Robert Lansing in this regard. They proceeded from the analogy 
that one or more rebellious parts of a country cannot be recognised. They firmly believed in 
the soon-to-be restored non-Bolshevik Russia. Such a Russia would have the right to decide its 
own destiny. Washington did not rule out that after law and order was restored, any Russian 
government would unite the rebellious territories – by force if necessary. Such non-recognition 
of rebellious regions was requested by all Russian groups. At first this suited Wilson’s other 
views – non-interference in another country’s affairs squared with the policy of non-recognition 
of the Baltic states. The US opposition to Russia’s dismemberment simultaneously served as 
an opposition to the ambitions of some other states (particularly Japan). This policy was at the 
same time at odds with his slogans of internationalism and self-determination and even plans 
of establishing the League of Nations (Killen 1982: 65–78). 
Having arrived at the Paris Peace Conference, the US delegation, not unlike the represen-
tatives of the other states, was in a quandary over Russian issues (Walworth 1986). There was 
no clarity during the Conference whether Russia should be seen as a former Ally or rather a 
foe. Official relations with the Bolsheviks were not considered possible, but they could not be 
completely ignored, either. In part, the Soviets were able to take advantage of the indecision, 
developing a kind of quasi-diplomacy and playing on inter-ally differences (Thompson 1966: 91). 
The Russian Division of the State Department and the Undersecretary of State Frank Polk 
applied pressure for the USA to recognise the Kolchak government only in Russia (Melton 2001: 
141). The delegation in Paris hesitated, however, for Wilson still wished to restore Russia’s de-
mocratic government. In the meantime, even the Japanese were inclined to recognise Kolchak. 
In June 1919, Kolchak promised the Allies that he would restore democracy in Russia, and this 
became an excuse for stomaching such a situation for a while. Wilson and the US delegation 
could call their mission to Paris completed and return home. However, Kolchak only offered 
an illusory and temporary solution. Thus, Wilson left Paris without any clarity over the Russian 
issue. In September 1919, it was obvious that Kolchak would shortly be defeated in Russia’s 
ongoing civil war, yet the USA still had no clarity over how to proceed (Killen: 75). 
A sort of summary and generalisation of the triangle of the US–Russia–Baltic relations in 
1917–1922 was a document called the Colby note. It signified the USA’s official compromise 
over the issue of Russia and at the same time, unfortunately, of the Baltic states. This position 
was published in August 1920 in the form of a declaration by the Secretary of State Bainbridge 
Colby. This public declaration was preceded by a lively exchange of ideas in the US diplomatic 
circles throughout the spring and summer of 1920, resulting in a document which was fairly 
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controversial in content. Additionally, the document characterised the then US policy towards 
not only Russia, but also Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, beginning as early as in 1917–1918. 
Washington refused to officially recognise Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This can be explained 
and excused by the proposition that the Colby note echoed Washington’s concern for the am-
bitions of Britain, France, Japan and even Germany to dismember Russia. While rejecting the 
Bolsheviks on the one hand, the document promoted the restoration of the Russian Empire on 
the other (Saul 2006: 14–15). This all the more raises the question: what and to what extent 
changed thereafter in just over a year’s time? Why was the position expressed in the Colby 
note abandoned shortly afterwards? 
COMMERCIAL COMPETITION BET WEEN THE SUPERPOWERS IN THE BALTIC STATES? 
At that time, the USA and Britain were already engaged in an intense rivalry for Russia’s 
markets and trade opportunities, among them for the so-called Bolshevist gold shipped out to 
Sweden and elsewhere, mostly via Tallinn. The USA had given to their private entrepreneurs 
and traders free rein to do private business with Russia. Britain was preparing to conclude a 
government-level agreement, which was finalised in March 1921. Beginning from 1920 the 
ports of the Baltic states were gaining an increasingly important role in the rivalry (White 
1992: 148–160). The Baltic states became a kind of springboard in the competition between 
the USA, Britain, and Germany for the elusive El Dorado – the Russian market (Hiden 1987, 
Kirby 1974: 364–370). The USA emerged as the most successful of the three, without formally 
recognising the Bolsheviks or concluding a government-level trade agreement. Its trade with 
Russia in the early 1920s was bigger by volume and value than that of Britain and Germany 
taken together (White: 199–211). 
Thus, there was no explicit trade-related pressure to abandon the stance expressed in the 
aforementioned Colby note. The USA maintained a similar edge right up to the spring of 1922. 
There were no formal obstacles to ship movement and trade in the Baltic states. In Tallinn 
alone, Consul Charles H. Albrecht and Vice-Consuls George G. Fuller and William C. Perkins 
were conducting their duties under the Riga-based Commissioner Office in early 1922. In ad-
dition, the Consulate employed four local residents.3 The spring of 1922, however, saw some 
fundamental changes that forced Washington to retreat somewhat from its previous, relatively 
entrenched, position over the issue of the recognition of the Baltic states. 
Russia’s official ambassador until then, Bakhmetev, no longer had many opportunities 
to carry on. His credits were closed, and in June 1922 the operations of the former Russian 
embassy as a whole were suspended. In a situation like that, Washington found it increasingly 
complicated, both legally and ethically, to further delay recognising the Baltic states and defer 
granting official statuses to their official representatives. 
THE ISSUE OF RUSSIA’S DEBTS 
The situation in Russia’s finance before World War I appeared rather solid. Its gold reserves were 
the largest in Europe, having increased fivefold over the last 30 years (1886–1914). Most of the 
reserves had been deposited inside the country. European investors, in particular French, were 
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eager to acquire Russia’s securities, both those of the Government and of private enterprises. 
Russia’s bonds were bought by foreign banks and private persons alike, and by 1917 foreign 
investors accounted for 34% of the shareholders of Russia’s banks (Sirotkin 2000: 21–34). Ac-
cording to some sources, Russia’s debts and other liabilities in January 1914 were estimated 
at 6.568 billion dollars, of which about a half were foreign loans. Other sources, however, put 
Russia’s pre-war debts at no more than 3.75 billion dollars, or 7.5 billion roubles (Moulton and 
Paslovsky 1926: 60). In the following years, Russia’s situation was complicated by the fact that 
until then 45% of its exports had gone to the countries it was now at war with, while 90% of 
its debts were owed to the Allied countries (Moulton and Paslovsky 1971: 26). 
Adding up all the debts and loans from the Tsarist Russia and Provisional Government periods, 
the total topped the 20 billion dollar mark already by September 1917 (Fisk 1924: 105–112, 
132). In the three years of the World War, most of Russia’s gold was transferred to banks of 
other countries, primarily to cover military expenses. The so-called Russian debts became one 
of the central themes with regard to the end of World War I and the reparations issue. 
The debts issue gained currency in the USA in connection with the presidential elections in 
1920. The Republicans asserted that the issue would be tabled immediately after they came 
to power. The debt amounts were registered as official claims and submitted to the Congress 
in a special report. Next, the World War Foreign Debt Commission was set up and assigned 
the task of preparing bilateral agreements for repayment of the debts. In the following nine 
years, the USA concluded the so-called refund contracts with 13 countries. These stipulated the 
obligations, repayment deadlines, and interest rates (Pulen 1987: 5). Actually, 15 agreements 
were drafted, but Armenia and Russia eventually dropped out. 
By that time, Washington had managed to reckon up the total of the pre- and after-war loans 
contracted by Russia and the food and other aid sent there. During 1917, the US Treasury Depart-
ment had allotted still more credit to Russia’s Provisional Government, totalling 450,000,000 
dollars. Of that, about 187,730,000 was transferred to the direct disposal of Russia’s government 
as a loan. In 1919, approximately 4,465,000 dollars’ worth of food aid dispatched to Russia was 
covered from the President’s special fund. About 400,000 dollars was spent on various military 
supplies, which was also charged to the former Provisional Government’s account. Added to 
that were 96,000,000 dollars’ worth of private loans allotted by some US banks. Thus, the li-
abilities of Russia’s Provisional Government amounted to 302,000,000 dollars, by US calculations 
(Loans to Foreign Goverments 1921: 89). Following the fall of Kerenski’s government, the USA 
cancelled the credits to Russia, and the Bolsheviks in their turn declared that they renounced 
all of Russia’s former debts and obligations. At the same time, the credit allocated to Russia’s 
Provisional Government and the gold reserves deposited by it in the USA still remained at the 
disposal of Boris Bakhmetev who had arrived as Ambassador in June 1917. 
THE DEBTS ISSUE AND THE BALTIC STATES 
This inevitably bore relation to the Baltic states, directly or less directly. For instance, Finland’s 
envoy in Tokyo Gustaf John Ramstedt wrote a private letter to his long-time acquaintance Oskar 
Kallas, Estonia’s envoy in London, on 3 April 1922. In it, he communicated his conversation with 
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the US ambassador in Japan Charles B. Warren. Warren held that such dwarf states could not 
be recognised, not even temporarily, for Russia would rise again and need its Baltic Sea ports. 
He emphasised that Russia should not be divided or dismembered. G. J. Ramstedt reminded 
him that the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians were all different nationalities and had the 
right to self-determination, as Wilson had promised in 1918. In response, Warren held that 
the times of nationalism were past; furthermore, if everyone broke away from Russia on the 
grounds of their language, then who would pay Russia’s debts?4
Whether and to what extent the territories that seceded from Russia in 1918–1921 should 
have refunded the debts and other disbursements granted to Russia in different times were 
increasingly intricate to answer. At the same time, a well-founded question was raised why the 
Baltic states should pay part of those debts at all when the repayment of the remaining sums 
allocated to Russia became more and more doubtful. 
Yet a further 30 million dollars or so was added to the Russia-related sums, which were 
directly associated with Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and had been incurred after 
1918. By 1921, Washington had adopted the position that “if these Governments remain as 
separate Governments, then, of course, these obligations will eventually be paid by them, if 
paid at all. But if Russia, when it finally emerges from its present chaotic condition, insists on 
the recognition of its original boundaries, these Governments will be part of Russia”5. 
Estonia’s liabilities to the USA were derived in a manner relatively similar to the debts 
of Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland. They originated from the treaty concluded in Paris in June 
1919. The prelude to that dated further back. The Americans’ decisions in December 1917 and 
January 1918 to add the Baltic provinces of Russia to the list of the so-called Hoover food aid 
recipients may be considered the beginning. The Congress allocated special funds to that end, 
and the first aid shipments reached the Baltic territory in March–April 1919. Even the loan 
for the procurement of seed grain from Denmark in the spring of 1919 was coordinated with 
Hoover and his American Relief Administration (Jaanson 1989: 90–92). 
In May 1919, some Americans turned to members of the Estonian delegation at the Peace 
Conference in private and notified that it was now possible to purchase various US goods. 
Namely, at that time they began to liquidate the stockpiles created for the US troops. The 
Liquidation Commission was formed to sell the stuff as quickly as possible and at a good price. 
Its president was Edwin B. Parker, who until then had been responsible for supplying the US 
military, and its members were Brigadier General Charles G. Dawes, Senator Homer H. Johanson 
and Henry F. Hollis (Surface and Bland 1931: 53–54, 177–178). The Commission was rather 
short-lived, since the military could not remain engaged in trading things forever. The American 
Relief Administration, headed by Hoover, bought the supplies from the US military for the 
funds allocated to it and then palmed them all off on the European countries (Organization of 
American Relief 1943: 395–398). The interest and the needs in Europe were great. Especially 
essential, however, was such “aid” to Eastern Europe. Yet it is doubtful whether the Eastern 
4 A. G. J. Ramstedtin kokoelma. Kansio: 10 Suomen Kansallisarkisto. 
5 Ibid., 90.
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Europeans were able to discern in the spring–summer of 1919 that all that was not free aid but 
would subsequently have to be reimbursed in reality and at a rather high price. 
Estonians purchased various goods from the Americans for just over 12 million dollars. As no 
money arrived from Estonia, the sum was accounted as a loan, with interest thereon starting 
to accrue immediately. By 1922, Estonia’s debt liabilities to the USA had grown to about 16 
million. Compared to Europe’s superpowers, the figure was small but still more than twice as 
much as the indebtedness of Latvia (5.13 million) or Lithuania (4.98 million) to the USA. The 
corresponding figure for Finland was ca 8.28 million. 
Despite the domestic tension caused by the debate on the debt issue in the 1920s or the dif-
ficulties arising there from the Baltic states – US relations, the deal cannot be assessed as utterly 
negative. Thanks to the debt, the Baltic states grew into an important player for the USA, one 
to be reckoned with. At the end of the day, the debt issue may have been the main argument 
for the USA for recognising the Baltic states de jure in June 1922. Namely, the USA could not 
afford the precedent that some countries would never pay their debts – for instance, on the 
pretext that Washington did not recognise them as independent countries – as it counted the 
debt as a government liability. Thus, it was possible to effectively exert pressure on the USA. 
Estonia nominated Nikolai Köstner as a consular agent in the USA in 1921; he did not feel 
very comfortable in the USA. Judging by the correspondence between the US representa-
tives in Riga and Tallinn, the antipathy was mutual. Köstner was seen as neither a particularly 
suitable nor a very strong representative.6 The consul stressed in his letters to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs that there was no point forfeiting their peace of mind over the US debts 
pending grant of official recognition (Medijainen 1997: 252). Such indirect pressure added to 
the discomfort of the US representatives over their status in the Baltic capitals. They found it 
increasingly challenging to justify their special standing and to explain why the Baltic states 
might not enjoy the same privileges in the USA as the US Commissioner, consuls and attachés 
did in Riga, Tallinn, and Kaunas. 
The debts topic gained particular currency in the spring of 1922. The European countries 
were preparing for economic conferences to be held in Genoa and the Hague. The USA refused 
to send an official delegation there, settling for just an observer, or the Ambassador to Italy 
(Siegel 1996: 69). The Soviet delegation was also invited to the conferences. There were rumours 
of a potential bilateral agreement on debts and reparations. This period has been regarded as 
the peak in the rapprochement between Britain and Soviet Russia. London first of all hoped 
for a breakthrough in Russia’s debt issue, while Moscow looked for credits (White: 172). The 
conferences failed, however, and no agreements to resolve Europe’s fundamental problems 
were born. In connection with the Genoa conference, a common front appeared to be develop-
ing between the Baltic states themselves on the one hand and between the Baltic states and 
Russia on the other. All of the said countries were keen to see the debts issue taken off the 
agenda quickly. The Baltic states did not want to be forced to pay off part of Russia’s former 
6 Albrecht Paraphrase of telegram sent by the American Consul, Reval, on May 3, 1924, to the American 
Commissioner, Riga, RG 58 American Consulate, Reval, Correspondence 1921, 400–811.1 Gen. NA.
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debts to the USA or to any European country for that matter. Considering these developments, 
it cannot be ruled out that the de jure recognition of the Baltic states was a small precaution 
on the part of the USA against the attainment of such unity, particularly on the debts issue. 
The World War Foreign Debt Commission commenced in Washington with sessions in the 
Treasury Building on 18 April 1922. After the first session, it was decided that the Treasury 
Department would issue notifications to all the countries indebted to the USA, including to 
the US Grain Corporation, War Department, Navy Department or the ARA. In June 1922, the 
first summaries were made of responses from individual countries. From the Baltic states, 
Lithuania’s representative Valdemaras Carneckis was the first to be called to give account to 
the Commission on 29 June. Lithuania promised to provide an official explanation shortly for 
the failure to perform its obligations to the USA (Minutes 1927: 1–6, 14). 
Beginning from August 1922, all the communication between the Commission and the Baltic 
states became official. The US State Department notified the Committee that the Baltic states 
had been officially recognised and that the governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had 
been informed of the Commission’s task to conclude a bilateral debt repayment agreement 
with each country. 
Köstner had returned just before the US de jure recognition, and now Estonia was in no hurry 
to nominate a new representative. Instead, it was the US representatives in the Baltic states 
who in October–November 1922 requested the latter to send special finance representatives or 
diplomats to Washington.7 It was not before April 1923 that Estonia announced its intention to 
nominate in the nearest future an official representative who would contact the Commission. 
The delay tactic may be understood: now that the main objective – de jure recognition – had 
already been achieved, the Baltic states could afford to wait and see if, when and how the other, 
greater, debtors come to terms with the USA. At that time, all the European countries started 
to present reasons and excuses for reducing or even cancelling the debt. The Republican US 
administration was unwilling to allow any exceptions. They did not want to set any precedent 
to be taken advantage of by much greater debtors. Therefore, Estonia was forced to sign a debt 
settlement agreement on 25 October 1925 (The Estonian Debt: 1–7). Under it, instalments and 
interests were to be paid until 1984, by which time Estonia would have refunded more than 33 
million dollars. The debt proved a perpetual thorn in Estonia–US relations. Diplomatic notes 
on the debt issue were exchanged as late as in the middle of 1940. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout the 20th century, the US foreign policy was often portrayed as the protagonist 
and protector of liberal and democratic values, sometimes even as the performer of America’s 
so-called special mission. The recognition of the Baltic states, however, posed a challenge to 
some of the avowed core values. In 1919–1922, the slogan of self-determination was subject 
to two irreconcilable interpretations in the USA. According to one, Russia had the right to 
7  Charles Albrecht to Evan E. Young, November 1, 1922, RG 58 American Consulate Reval, Correspondence 
1922, 811.4–865.12, NA.
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determine the future of its own and of the parts of its former empire after the Civil War. In 
what form that should happen remained unclear. The convention of some sort of all-Russian 
(Constituent) assembly was the most favoured one. According to the other, the right to self-
determination was rendered as the right of border areas to break away from Russia. The latter 
was the main argument of Estonia and Latvia, but Lithuanian attempts to use the so-called 
historical arguments were no more successful. 
In the case of the Baltic states, Washington delayed the resolution of the dilemma that had 
developed. This gave rise to documents interpretable in diverse ways, such as the Colby note 
in August 1920 and ultimately also the decision to recognise the Baltic states on 28 July 1922. 
With regard to the latter, the decisive factor, apart from the political developments, was the US 
hope that the recognition would enable a successful completion of the business deals brokered 
with the Baltic states during 1919. Value-based politics failed to make a difference at this point, 
whereas economic considerations rendered the decision-making much easier. The path to the 
recognition of the Baltic states was slightly smoothed by Washington’s and Moscow’s pursuits 
to establish mutual unofficial relations via the Far Eastern Republic. Such a compromise would 
have undermined the legitimacy of not recognising the independence of the Baltic states. 
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